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O P I N I O N
Towards the neurobiology of 
emotional body language
Beatrice de Gelder
Abstract | People’s faces show fear in many different circumstances. However, when 
people are terrified, as well as showing emotion, they run for cover. When we see 
a bodily expression of emotion, we immediately know what specific action is 
associated with a particular emotion, leaving little need for interpretation of the 
signal, as is the case for facial expressions. Research on emotional body language 
is rapidly emerging as a new field in cognitive and affective neuroscience. This 
article reviews how whole-body signals are automatically perceived and 
understood, and their role in emotional communication and decision-making.
What do body positions and movement 
reveal about emotions? From everyday exp-
erience we know that an angry face is more 
menacing when accompanied by a fist, and a 
fearful face more worrisome when the person 
is in flight (that is, running away). When a 
frightening event occurs, there might not be 
time to look for the fearful contortions in an 
individual’s face, but a quick glance at the 
body may tell us all we need to know. This 
article reviews what has been discovered 
so far and provides a framework for the 
interpretation of and further investigation of 
emotional body language (EBL).
Many valuable insights into human emo-
tion and its neurobiological bases have been 
obtained from the study of facial expressions. 
By comparison, the neurobiological bases of 
EBL are relatively unexplored1–5. Human and 
non-human primates are especially sensi-
tive to the gestural signals made by other 
primates, and use these signals as guides for 
their own behaviour. Fearful faces signal a 
threat, but do not provide information about 
either the source of the threat or the best 
way to deal with it. By contrast, fearful body 
positions signal a threat and at the same time 
specify the action undertaken by the indi-
viduals fearing for their safety. Unravelling 
these behavioural aspects brings emotion 
researchers closer to the evolutionary link 
between emotion and behaviour and the 
phylogenetic continuity of emotion–action 
circuitry across species. It also sheds light on 
disorders that combine emotional and motor 
components, such as autism, schizophrenia 
and Huntington’s disease.
Studying the neurobiology of EBL is 
particularly timely because the topic 
introduces a new and biologically realistic 
context to what has already been learned 
about human emotion from isolated facial 
expressions during the past two decades. 
EBL consists of an emotion expressed in the 
whole body, comprising coordinated move-
ments and often a meaningful action, and so 
prompts research to go beyond facial expres-
sions and to consider issues of perception 
of movement and action, which have so far 
been researched in isolation and not specifi-
cally related to perception of EBL.
After discussing why the role of the body 
is important in understanding emotion and 
communication, I describe research on per-
ceptual similarities in the neuroanatomy and 
temporal dynamics between face and body 
perception, and conclude that recognition 
of facial expressions is strongly influenced 
by EBL. First, I ask why seeing emotional 
bodies automatically transmits the emotion 
and I relate this question to the combined 
presence of emotions, movement and 
actions. Next, I review dissociations between 
these different aspects in some clinical 
populations, including the role of deliberate 
processes and consciousness. Finally, I sug-
gest an integrated framework for research on 
EBL perception and discuss key outstanding 
questions.
History of emotional body language
There is considerable history associated 
with the link between emotion and behav-
iour6, and the relationship between emotion 
and whole-body action was at the centre 
of the pioneering work of Bulwer7, Bell8, 
Gratiolet9 and Duchène de Boulogne10, 
culminating in Darwin’s evolutionary 
approach to emotions and their bodily 
expressions11. In a radical departure from 
the Cartesian view of emotions as private 
mental episodes, Darwin argued that emo-
tions are adaptive in the sense that they 
prompt an action that is beneficial to the 
organism, given its environmental circum-
stances. Darwin described the body expres-
sions (for example, EBL, vocalizations and 
facial expressions) associated with emotions 
in animals and humans, with a particular 
emphasis on the link between emotion and 
action6,12, and highlighted the roots of facial 
expressions in adaptive actions13. So, a spe-
cies’ ability to produce and perceive some 
basic categories of EBL is an integral part of 
its phylogenetic history.
P E R S P E C T I V E S
242 | MARCH 2006 | VOLUME 7  www.nature.com/reviews/neuro
Emotion and the amygdala. Emotion is 
a multidimensional phenomenon, and 
theories of the human emotional brain range 
from highly cognitive processes preceeding 
deliberate action to perception, and to reflex-
like behaviour6,14–16. However, I focus only 
on the perception of EBL. Current models 
of human emotion17–23 place the amygdala 
at the core of a network of emotional brain 
structures, involving the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
premotor cortex and somatosensory cortex. 
In animal models it is thought that there is a 
wider network of amygdala connections, as 
animal species investigated by researchers 
show a broader range of behaviours, includ-
ing posture, movement, vocalizations, odour 
and touch. The amygdala decodes the affec-
tive relevance of sensory inputs and initiates 
adaptive behaviours via its connections to 
the motor systems24 (BOX 1). Similar proc-
esses are triggered in situations in which the 
body is directly attacked, for example, when 
external stimuli invade personal space and 
defensive EBL is evoked by direct stimulation 
of the areas listed above25.
Faces belong to bodies
From our encounters with others, we are just 
as familiar with EBL as with facial expres-
sions. EBL is perceived as a means of influ-
encing others, for which social psychologists 
have provided detailed descriptions (for 
examples, see REF. 26). During the past few 
decades, some isolated psychological studies 
have appeared5,27, but neuroscientific experi-
ments on how humans perceive bodies have 
been reported only recently. A challenging 
question in the wake of the long-standing 
debate about whether the brain is function-
ally specialized to process faces is whether 
there is also an area in the brain that is spe-
cifically activated by seeing body movement 
or posture. Are we as expert at interpreting 
body language as we are faces? There are 
areas in the brain that respond to facial 
stimuli, but is there a corresponding area 
in the brain that is dedicated to bodies? Are 
the same areas involved in perceiving facial 
expressions and EBL? Are consciousness and 
attentional resources needed for processing 
bodies and recognizing body movement and 
posture? Some of these questions can already 
be answered.
How do we perceive bodies? Research on 
visual recognition of bodies started by 
addressing the classic questions in the face 
recognition literature: whether the perceptual 
system is tuned to the overall structure and 
whether there is a dedicated functional neural 
system. It is already clear that faces and bodies 
both have configurational properties. In the 
first stages of face, as well as body, perception 
the brain is tuned to extracting the overall 
configuration rather than the details28,29. 
Besides behavioural evidence, there are 
findings from single-cell recordings that also 
show a degree of specialization for either 
face or neutral body images in the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS)30,31. Functional MRI 
studies in humans32 indicate that a region 
near the middle occipital gyrus (known as the 
extrastriate body area, EBA) responds selec-
tively to bodies but shows little response to 
isolated faces33–35. Interestingly, precursors of 
adult body recognition are already apparent 
in early development, as has been noted for 
facial recognition36. In 3-month-old infants, 
distorted bodies have a significant effect on 
the brain potential that is typically evoked by 
the sight of faces and bodies37.
Does the convergence across these results 
indicate a degree of body specificity even 
more strongly, or does it imply that there is a 
module for body perception, as is sometimes 
argued for faces? Or, alternatively, as is 
clearly the case for face perception, is body 
perception implemented in several different 
areas (mainly concentrated in the occipital 
gyrus and fusiform gyrus) that have different 
functions and are active at different moments 
in time21,38? An answer on the specific neural 
basis of body representation depends on 
which body attribute is being considered (for 
example, posture, movement, instrumental 
action or emotional expression). Adopting 
this network perspective, I concentrate on 
how the brain deals with the emotional 
expression imparted by whole bodies.
Neural basis and temporal dynamics. The 
first brain imaging study of EBL with realistic 
body stimuli used fearful and happy EBL 
images, each of which was compared with 
images of neutral whole-body actions (for 
example, getting dressed or opening a door). 
Fearful bodies activate the two main areas 
associated with the processing of facial 
expressions of fear — the amygdala and the 
right middle fusiform gyrus. When we see 
neutral, fearful or happy whole-body expres-
sions with the facial expression blurred, fear 
images activate these areas34 (FIG. 1).
The similarity between perception of 
facial expressions and EBL extends to temp-
oral dynamics. Recent studies show that 
we process bodies as rapidly as faces29,37,39, 
and perceive the same properties of both 
facial and body stimuli. This is shown by the 
finding that body images produce the N170 
(a waveform in the electroencephalogram 
(EEG) with negative amplitude that peaks 
about 170 ms after stimulus presentation), 
which was originally viewed as the first 
temporal marker of face-specific processing. 
It seems that the initial facial and body image 
Box 1 | Emotions and the amygdala
The involvement of the amygdala in emotional behaviour has been known for some time87, and the 
amygdala figures prominently in both human and non-human emotion research16,23. The amygdala 
has a complex structure consisting of twelve different subnuclei, many of which are bilaterally 
connected to different basal ganglia and cortical structures18,78,88. In the macaque, the amygdala 
receives inputs from the superior temporal sulcus and the ventrolateral orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC)89, as well as from their reciprocal connections, which gives the amygdala, to some extent, 
control over the ventrolateral OFC90. The amygdala seems to be particularly involved in the 
assignment of signal relevance17,75,91–93 and, as a consequence, in the modulation of brain structures 
that control behaviour. Of particular interest is the modulation of structures that relate to fear 
behaviour, elicited by fear signals, whether these signals consist of sound16, sight, smell or touch25. 
Lesions of the amygdala cause a lack of social inhibition in the adult primate93 and abolish 
characteristic fear behaviour94,95, and, in humans, lead to excessive trust of others96. Congenital 
anomalies and acquired lesions, as well as deficits in functional connections, cause changes in the 
social behaviour of the young macaque97–99.
As proposed here, the amygdala has one role in a network of predominantly subcortical 
structures and another in a network of cortical structures. The first circuit is the basis of automatic 
reflex-like emotional behaviour and the second sustains recognition of emotional body language 
(EBL), deliberation and action (see also BOX 2). The amygdala exerts a crucial modulatory effect on 
other (sub)cortical structures that process sensory input and on motor structures without in depth 
processing by higher cognitive and cortical systems. So, emotional behaviour can be initiated even 
if visual stimuli such as EBL, facial expressions, sounds or smells are processed without conscious 
recognition100–102. This ‘blindfeeling’ might occur when unseen EBL automatically activates facial 
mimicry and triggers peripheral physiological changes, which William James considered the 
essence of emotion. These feedforward effects of EMG (electromyography) occur in parallel with 
feedback effects on the amygdala from detailed stimulus processing in the ventral cortex, as has 
been shown for fusiform cortex to amygdala modulations33,34,102.
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c  Fusiform gyrusa b Amygdalaprocessing stages are probably similar37,39,40, 
as these stimuli elicit comparable amplitude, 
latency and scalp distribution of the N170. 
Evidence suggests that objects are not proc-
essed in the same way, as control objects did 
not generate an N170 (REF. 29; FIG. 2).
EBL overshadows facial expressions. If bodies 
are recognized rapidly, it would be expected 
that EBL might influence face processing in 
the earliest stages of facial recognition, and 
even when attention is focused on the facial 
expression. To investigate this possibility, 
facial expressions were combined with 
congruent or incongruent bodily expressions 
(FIG. 3). EEG responses to these face–body 
combinations39 showed that the brain is sen-
sitive (within 100 ms) to any incongruence 
between facial expression and EBL.
So, compared with a range of control 
objects, both bodies and faces trigger special-
ized visual recognition skills. However, why 
they do this is not clear. Is it because of our 
visual expertise, or because bodies are salient 
and grab our attention more than inanimate 
or even animate objects in the environment? 
Or is it because the sensory, emotional and 
motor attributes we are capable of generating 
in our own mind and body influence our 
visual perception of bodies and faces? New 
research indicates that our own emotional 
and behavioural competences do affect our 
visual perception, and so the issue of body 
perception moves out of the strictly visual 
domain to include those brain areas that are 
involved with emotion and behaviour.
Why emotional bodies are contagious
Fear is contagious, as are joy and sadness, but 
what is the underlying mechanism for this? 
Is it the emotion expressed? Perhaps it is the 
movement represented or implied? Or the 
action represented? Or is it a combination 
of all these factors? If so, does one trigger 
the others? Functional brain imaging in 
participants passively viewing images of 
whole bodies shows activity in a complex of 
areas that are known for processing not only 
emotions and biological movement but also 
goal-directed actions. By comparison, view-
ing fearful whole-body expressions increases 
activity in areas that are known to specifically 
process emotional information (that is, the 
amygdala, OFC, ACC, anterior insula and 
nucleus accumbens)2 as well as in subcortical 
structures (mainly the superior colliculus, 
pulvinar and caudate nucleus) (BOX 2).
Furthermore, the use of body images 
might boost the activity in structures that 
have a role in our own body experience, such 
as the somatosensory cortex and insula, more 
than images of faces or affective pictures do. 
The OFC controls regulation of emotion and 
bodily feelings as well as the brain’s represen-
tation of the body15, and acts in concert with 
the amygdala and somatosensory cortex and 
insula, which are activated in the fear body 
condition. This is consistent with neural 
activity in cortical areas that provide internal 
representations of one’s bodily state41, such 
as the anterior insula, which is important in 
connecting the medial prefrontal cortex and 
the limbic system, and, in turn, has a role in 
interoception42.
The data so far indicate that emotional 
contagion — the automatic spread of emo-
tion and body movement to another person 
Figure 1 | The fusiform gyrus and the amygdala show increased activation in response to 
bodily expressions of fear. a | Example of the stimuli used: top, body expression of fear; bottom, 
emotionally neutral body posture (pouring liquid into a container). b | Functional MRI (fMRI) activation 
associated with fearful compared with neutral bodies, averaged across seven participants, in Talairach 
space. Activation shown is in response to the fearful bodies (yellow) in the fusiform face area (FFA). No 
activation is seen for the neutral bodies (blue). c | Average percentage signal change in functionally 
defined regions of interest in the FFA and amygdala in fearful compared with neutral body postures. 
The right hemisphere (RH) shows significantly more activation than the left (LH) in the amygdala only 
(p <0.001). Adapted, with permission, from REF. 34 © (2003) Cell Press.
Box 2 | Emotions and motor programs
Emotion has traditionally been connected with motor activity, but the direction of the connection 
has long been a matter of speculation. One extreme view is the James–Lange theory, which argues 
that the subjective experience of emotion is a byproduct of the motor activity elicited by the 
stimulus. The discovery of mirror neurons again draws attention to motor structures. ‘Mirror 
neurons’ in the ventral premotor cortex area F5 and in the parietal area 7b fire when an animal 
performs a given action, as well as when the same action is observed (for a review, see REF. 103). 
Functional neuroimaging provides evidence that humans have similar mirror neurons. Based on 
these findings, it has been proposed that mirror neurons are the basis of social cognition58. 
However, direct support for the role of mirror neurons in perceiving emotion is still scarce. A strong 
defence of the role of mirror neurons in emotion comes from research into autism. People with 
autism show less activity in the mirror neuron system when either passively observing or actively 
imitating facial expressions104, consistent with reduced cortical thickness in mirror neuron brain 
areas in autism71,105. However, alternative explanations can be envisaged. One is that a deficit in 
action representation and mirror neurons is itself due to a deficit in the amygdala99 that causes 
poor connectivity to superior temporal sulcus and premotor cortex structures62. This makes the 
clinical pattern of emotion deficits observed so far in autism quite similar to that of patients with 
amygdala lesions, who also show normal mimicry49. In neither case does the (in)ability to show 
automatic facial mimicry prove that mirror neurons are the basis of social cognition.
However, there is a more general explanation  — in line with the two-systems theory proposed 
here — for the apparent similarity between fear observed and that displayed in response to it by 
the observer. Perception of a fear stimulus (whether this is a sound, face or body) triggers a fear 
reaction in the observer (either in the face or body, or both) based on direct activation of a fear 
motor program that is encoded in subcortical circuitry and not on imitation. Fear reactions and 
fear contagion following the observation of fear reactions need not involve the cortical action 
circuit in which mirror neurons have a role, at least not at the basic level. Of course, detailed 
studies of emotional body language other than fear are needed in order to understand the 
interactions between the two systems.
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when an individual is viewing EBL — is 
based on perception of the emotion, and it 
is therefore not surprising to find an overlap 
with the activations observed in studies using 
facial expressions. However, significant fear-
related activation in response to EBL was also 
observed in areas that have a role in action 
representation and in other motor areas. An 
important issue to resolve is whether the fear-
related activation observed in the motor area 
follows from fear perception, or the other 
way around, as when perception of a move-
ment leads to recognition of its emotion.
Bodies in movement. As movement is a key 
feature of EBL in the natural world, it prob-
ably contributes to the recognition of EBL, 
and may induce emotion with minimal input 
from the other aspects of EBL. How much 
of EBL recognition/perception is percep-
tion of movement? And which comes first 
— perception of movement or perception of 
emotion? Passive viewing of still body images 
activates motor areas of the brain. This might 
be a consequence of the brain filling in the 
missing dynamic information43,44, but it is 
noteworthy that activity in the fear-related 
brain areas is much higher than for neutral 
bodies representing actions, which suggests 
another source beyond implicit movement 
perception. Indeed, during the centuries 
before the advent of media that enabled 
dynamic image production, powerful emo-
tional effects were generated in the visual arts 
with still images (for an example, see BOX 3).
Biological movement provides important 
information about the nature of the object 
that is moving, the direction of movement 
or the meaning of the action, and this is 
observed even in the early stages of develop-
ment. Three-month-old infants can discrimi-
nate point-light displays of human movement 
from random patterns45. Neurons selectively 
activated by biological motion have been 
found in the monkey STS46. Animal study 
results indicate that sensitivity to biological 
movement appears early in development. For 
example, newly hatched chicks preferentially 
approached point-light sequences that sug-
gest biological motion47, which might be 
a pre requisite for ‘filial imprinting’. Early 
sensitivity to movements of members of the 
same species might sustain body recognition 
in infants. It might be an important trigger 
in neonatal development, as is indicated by 
deficits in perceiving biological movement 
that are associated with autism37 (BOX 2).
There is already some evidence of the 
power of movement alone in the induction 
of emotion. The movement of an area of dots 
as a collective that is perceived as pleasant 
triggers amygdala and fusiform cortex activ-
ity33, as well as activity in premotor cortex and 
sensorimotor areas48. Consistent with these 
findings, damage to the amygdala48 impairs 
our ability to recognize emotions from simple 
geometrical figures, and, as a consequence, 
affected patients report the movement but 
do not perceive this movement as an interac-
tion between agents. Of course, these are 
cognitively challenging stimuli requiring the 
observer to ‘anthro pomorphise’48, and these 
may appeal more to the so called ‘theory of 
mind’ skills, whereby the brain is challenged 
to come up with more theory-based interpre-
tations than that it is engaged in perception.
Bodies in action. The previous question 
concerning the role of movement in EBL 
perception can also be raised about EBL 
and action. Both the fusiform body area49 
and the EBA are sensitive to actions shown 
by the body50. In real life, biological move-
ments frequently consist of goal-directed 
actions. For example, on seeing someone 
fleeing, observers describe the action rather 
than the movement — that is, the person 
is trying to reach the exit rather than is 
running away. Consistent with single-cell 
recordings in the macaque brain, the results 
of brain imaging studies in humans51–53 show 
that the STS, parietal cortex and premotor 
cortex are activated during the perception 
of biological movements (for a review, see 
REF. 54) and of object-directed actions55. The 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, precentral 
gyrus, supplementary motor area (SMA) and 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL)55 all have central 
roles in organizing and realizing our motor 
behaviours, as well as in the perception of the 
behaviours of others (for a review, see REF. 53).
More recently, the discovery of neurons 
that encode complex movements and actions 
(mirror neurons)52,56,57 has added a new 
dimension to the role that motor areas might 
have in perception of body movement and 
EBL. It has been proposed that mirror neu-
rons provide the neurobiological basis for 
all emotional and social cognition skills58,59 
(BOX 2). This means that, in contrast to 
animal models, in which the amygdala emo-
tionally tunes the motor system, in humans 
it could be motor neuron activity that 
spreads to the amygdala. This hypothesis 
was tested in a study that compared brain 
activations during passive viewing of still 
facial expressions and viewing of the same 
stimuli but with the instruction to imitate60. 
Higher amygdala activity was obtained in 
the imitation condition, and was taken as 
direct support for the hypothesis that motor 
system activation triggers the amygdala. 
However, this higher activity was obtained 
after instructions to imitate the expressions 
were given, so it could be argued that the 
imitation instruction led to more active 
encoding of the faces.
More recent studies used video clips of 
angry and neutral hand actions61, and either 
fearful or neutral whole-body gestures62. 
Comparing passive observation of neutral 
body gestures with angry hand movements 
and angry face movements revealed substan-
tial overlap between the face and hand condi-
tions, with other areas involved besides the 
face area in the fusiform cortex. When the 
observed hand action was performed with 
emotion, additional regions were recruited, 
including the right dorsal premotor area, the 
right medial prefrontal cortex, the left ante-
rior insula and a region in the rostral part of 
the supramarginal gyrus. Interestingly, only 
the supramarginal gyrus was specific for 
angry faces61. The results of this study suggest 
that watching an action that is performed 
Figure 2 | Recordings of the amplitude of the N170 waveform triggered by various stimuli. 
Faces and bodies generate similar amplitude patterns, and the same increase is observed when the 
faces and bodies are inverted. However, this effect is not obtained for control objects. Traces show 
averaged  event-related potentials (ERPs) at the P8 scalp site for upright and inverted faces (a), bodies 
(b) and control objects (c). Insets show scalp distributions of peak amplitude of the N170 electroen-
cephalogram produced by upright stimulus presentations. ERPs and topographies of faces and bodies 
were pooled across neutral and fearful faces and bodies29. Adapted, with permission, from REF. 29 © 
(2004) Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins.
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with emotion induces affective modulation 
of the motor program.
This particular issue was addressed in 
a study using video clips of whole bodies 
showing either a neutral or a fear expression62. 
Amygdala activity was found to be enhanced 
during the perception of both static and 
dynamic fear bodies, with increased activity 
in the STS and premotor cortex. Augmented 
responses in the STS and premotor cortex 
are related to increased connectivity between 
these regions and the amygdala. These 
results support the idea that the amygdala 
has a crucial role in tuning the motor system 
to the affective meaning of sensory inputs. 
Moreover, they support a relative independ-
ence between fear processing and action 
representation systems, rather than substanti-
ate the alternative proposal that perception of 
the emotion expressed in actions is primarily 
based on the representation of that action.
Neuropsychological dissociations 
Sensory, emotional and behavioural systems 
are closely interlinked in the normal percep-
tion of EBL and, together with emotional 
awareness required for decision making and 
carrying out actions, they define normal adult 
emotional cognition. But the study of clinical 
populations with selective deficits in one of 
the components sheds light on the integration 
that normally occurs between these areas.
Nonconscious recognition of EBL. The 
extensive literature on the role of attention 
and consciousness in the recognition of facial 
expressions convincingly establishes that 
some facial expressions are processed with-
out full awareness, either because they are 
processed with minimal attention or because 
they are simply not consciously seen. The fact 
that unattended EBL influences face recogni-
tion already suggests that EBL need not be 
explicitly noticed to have an effect39. Patients 
with hemispatial neglect ignore stimuli in 
the space contralateral to their right parietal 
lesion, but this neglect is strongly reduced 
when a fear body is presented in the nor-
mally neglected visual field63. This suggests 
that intact frontolimbic and visual areas 
might continue to mediate representation of 
emotional and action-related information 
conveyed by fearful EBL despite damage to 
the right parietal lobe.
Patients with complete loss of vision 
in one hemifield present a radical test of 
unconscious perception of EBL, because 
under appropriate testing conditions they are 
not aware that a stimulus is being presented 
in their lesioned visual field. Following up on 
earlier findings of nonconscious recognition 
of facial expressions64–67, we observed that 
two such patients had affective blindsight68 
for EBL that was at least as strong as their 
previously reported blindsight for facial 
expressions63. This is consistent with the pos-
sibility68 that, in the absence of cortical input 
sustaining visual awareness, accurate blind 
guessing of the emotional stimulus category 
might, in part, be based on information from 
sensorimotor structures and the anterior 
parietal cortex that has a role in bodily expe-
rience and emotional feelings41. The subcor-
tical pathway mediating affective blindsight 
might exert an influence on the cortical areas 
representing bodily states and emotional 
feelings, possibly involving the right somato-
sensory cortex69. Both the amygdala and 
somatosensory cortex, as well as the OFC, 
have connections with visceral, autonomic 
and muscular centres of the body15,23,70.
Studies of visual deficits have already pro-
vided evidence that perceptions of emotion 
and movement can be dissociated from each 
other. Patients with amygdala deficits perceive 
the movements of animated shapes but do 
not describe them as social emotional inter-
actions48. They can imitate the facial expres-
sion49, as can patients with autism who have 
severe difficulty processing the emotions of 
others71. In other cases (for example, patients 
with Huntington’s disease), impairments in 
perceiving the movement, as well as the emo-
tion, have been observed, and this population 
offers us the possibility of understanding the 
combined role of subcortical and cortical 
emotion networks72,73.
A two-systems theory of EBL
Reviewing how emotion from EBL is proc-
essed in the brain leads us to a ‘two-systems’ 
model of emotion–behaviour connectivity. 
The amygdala is a key piece in the orchestra-
tion of two separate emotional circuits, an 
Figure 3 | Time course of face–body incongruence sensitivity. a | Examples of the four different 
categories of face–body compound stimuli used. Congruent and incongruent stimuli consisted of the 
same material in different combinations. The bodies of the two congruent stimulus conditions were 
swapped to create a mismatch between the emotion expressed by the face and that expressed by the 
body. b | Behavioural results of the facial expression task for the compound stimuli. Participants had to 
judge the expression of faces that were accompanied by either a congruent or incongruent bodily 
expression. Categorization of facial expressions in the presence of an incongruent body emotion 
significantly reduces accuracy and increases observers’ reaction times. c | Event-related potentials at 
occipital electrodes at scalp sites O1, Oz and O2 for the face–body compound stimuli, showing a sharp 
positive deflection peaking at ~100 ms. This so-called P1 scalp site component is sensitive for the 
mismatch between the facial expression and the emotional body language. Adapted, with permission, 
from REF. 39 © (2005) National Academy of Sciences USA.
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automated reflex-like circuit that predomi-
nantly resides in subcortical structures and 
a cortically controlled circuit in the service 
of recognition and deliberation. In higher 
organisms, both systems cooperate in decod-
ing EBL signals and monitoring behaviour 
following an emotional signal provided by 
EBL. The two-systems model regroups the 
structures that have been reported in the 
relevant literature so far, but viewed from 
the perspective of EBL, which could direct 
future research and help to define outstanding 
questions. Both systems are closely connected 
with a set of structures that support bodily 
sensations and bodily awareness. This model 
is added for the sake of completeness, but it is 
not the focus of this review. 
The primary network sustains the 
rapid automatic perception of EBL and 
preparation of adaptive reflexes. Subcortical 
structures are thought to have roles in this 
rapid, non-conscious route that have some 
similarities with what has been proposed for 
non-conscious recognition of faces74,75, but 
with stronger and more direct connections 
with motor structures. This route involves 
the superior colliculus, pulvinar, striatum 
(putamen and caudate) and basolateral amyg-
dala. Interactions in the pulvinar–superior 
colliculus–amygdala circuit might sustain 
preparation for adaptive behaviour, such as 
automatic fear behaviour following observa-
tion of a fear expression in EBL, and auto-
nomic responses (increases in heart rate and 
blood pressure). Single-cell recordings in the 
superior colliculus have shown that this area 
responds to the appearance and movement 
of stimuli, and that this detection of events 
is not dependent on detailed stimulus analy-
sis76. Most importantly, subregions of the 
superior colliculus support defensive reflexes 
(for example, freezing, withdrawal, flinching 
and exaggerated startle)77. The basolateral 
amygdala complex assigns affective value to 
incoming stimuli either directly or through 
its connections with other sensory 
systems75,78–80. It either stores associations 
directly, or modulates other areas78. The 
striatum is part of a neural circuit that guides 
behaviour, based on reward function (FIG. 4).
The second system consists of a cortical 
network with reciprocal connections to the 
primary circuit. This system includes the 
frontoparietal motor system, and connectiv-
ity between the amygdala and the prefrontal 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex has a 
major role in the processing carried out by 
this system. In this system, affective stimulus 
input is decoded in combination with past 
experience and memory. The main role 
of the second system is to perceive EBL in 
detail and to compute the behavioural con-
sequences of an emotion and to decide on a 
course of action in response to the stimulus; 
typically, the action is determined by the 
stimulus eliciting the bodily reaction (for 
example, fear expressed in running).
Both systems have connections with 
brain structures that have a role in connect-
ing awareness of bodily states to decision 
making41,69. The two input systems also have 
numerous interconnections, as well as con-
nections with the body awareness system, 
but can function relatively autonomously, 
and this relative autonomy guarantees that 
an alerting event signalled in the subcortical 
pathway elicits a rapid reflex-like reaction 
in the absence of detailed stimulus process-
ing and is not systematically overruled by 
BOX 3 | Feeling the fall of the angels
Still images can evoke strong emotional responses on first sight, and this ability to resonate with 
the emotional movement expressed in these images has been explored by visual artists since the 
beginning of painting and sculpture. For example, picture yourself in front of Rubens’ painting ‘The 
Fall of the Damned’ (see Further information). The first impression is one of turbulence and 
movement, and the cascade of falling bodies gives one an immediate feeling of vertigo. Only after 
that initial sensation does the story of the fallen angels come to mind and does the eye start to 
analyse the cascade of human bodies and speculate on the meaning of the visual scene. Initial 
reactions are based on our capacity to effortlessly read body language. It is only at a later, more 
deliberate stage of recognition that we elaborate on the context of the body language depicted in 
an image and explore it consciously. 
Figure 4 | The three interrelated brain networks involved in emotional body language. 
a | Reflex-like emotional body language (EBL) (orange) involves the superior colliculus (SC), pulvinar 
(Pulv), striatum and amygdala (AMG). b | Body awareness of EBL (green) involves the insula, 
somatosensory cortex (SS), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC). c | Visuomotor perception of EBL (blue) involves the lateral occipital complex (LOC), 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), intraparietal sulcus (IPS), fusiform gyrus (FG), amygdala (AMG) and 
premotor cortex (PM). Visual information from EBL enters in parallel via a subcortical (red) and a 
cortical (blue) input system. Feedforward connections from the subcortical to the cortical system and 
body awareness system are shown in red, reciprocal interactions between cortical system and body 
awareness system are shown in blue. Anatomical image adapted, with permission, from REF. 106 © 
(1996) Appleton & Lange.
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concurrently available positive information65. 
Similarly, fearful EBL can be triggered 
through electrical stimulation of the ventral 
premotor cortex25 without there being a con-
nection with the primary system to provide 
the emotional dimension of the EBL. The 
relative autonomy of the two systems has also 
been underscored in relation to other aspects 
of behaviour. For example, the primary 
system can gain dominance when pleasure-
seeking behaviour becomes habitual, as in 
drug addiction. The change from voluntary 
to more habitual and compulsive drug use 
represents a transition at the neural level 
from prefrontal cortical to striatal control 
over drug-seeking and drug-taking behav-
iour81,82. The interactions between the two 
systems might also be modulated by contex-
tual knowledge that can diminish reliance on 
feedback mechanisms in the neural circuitry 
of trial-and-error reward learning83.
Outlook
The available literature suggests that the 
brain processes EBL rapidly by a mechanism 
that involves neural resources known to have 
a role in perceiving emotional signals, such 
as facial expressions and structures involved 
in triggering behaviour and perceiving 
action. I suggest a two-systems model of 
EBL that encompasses, in dynamic equilib-
rium, EBL manifestations that are based on 
reflexes, which are automatically evoked by 
the emotional signal, and those that consist 
of deliberate emotional actions and are 
underwritten by a cortically controlled sys-
tem of reflection and decision-making. How 
specific is the two-systems model for EBL? 
To the extent that this model represents how 
the brain reacts to emotional signals, there 
are similarities with existing models of how 
facial expressions are recognized20,23, most 
directly with models based on two separate, 
relatively independent systems of cortically 
and subcortically based face processing21,36,74. 
However, there are significant differences 
when compared with face models of 
emotion, and future research will need to 
investigate this further. Indeed, the sight 
of a fearful face can mean many different 
things to the observer, including a signal to 
look for sources of danger or an invitation 
to empathize. However, the sight of a fearful 
body is a more direct cue to act. Moreover, 
the major structures in EBL described here 
also have a central role in pleasure-seek-
ing behaviour, and the present model has 
important similarities with the model of a 
dynamic interaction between an impulsive 
(reflex-like), and deliberate reflective (corti-
cally controlled) behaviour that is related to 
both affective experience and decision-mak-
ing81. The distinction between a reflex-like 
and a deliberate emotion–action system will 
allow us to integrate types of EBL other than 
that that is closely linked to the basic emo-
tions covered here, for example, the more 
deliberate and controllable EBL that occurs 
in sophisticated social interactions. Like 
primates, humans use their fine sensitivity 
to the gestural signals of others in assess-
ing status and manipulating outcome (for 
example, in negotiations in microeconomic 
situations), and in situations in which it 
is beneficial to hide our intentions (for 
example, when gambling).
Is EBL akin to language? At present, the 
expression ‘EBL’ is a convenient shortcut. 
It might be a useful heuristic approach to 
view EBL as a language consisting of a core 
emotional motor system with genuine primi-
tives and a combinatorial syntax. So far, this 
hypothesis seems consistent with results 
from motor control studies showing that the 
control of multi-joint movements is based 
on synergies between simpler components 
that encompass only a limited number of 
joints84,85. Synergies between the building 
blocks of EBL might define meaningful 
components for modelling kinematics84 and 
for explaining the perception of biological 
motion86.
Finally, the relationship between emotion 
and behaviour might depend on the specific 
emotion. For example, food-induced disgust 
is rigidly linked with specific motor activity, 
but this link is much more complex in the 
case of fear, in which the range of adaptive 
actions varies from running away from the 
sound of gunfire to freezing on the spot on 
seeing a snake. Furthermore, EBL might not 
have the typical one-to-one relationship with 
specific emotions that has been assumed for 
basic facial expressions since the work of 
Ekman in the 1970s. As exemplified by the 
results of basic facial expression studies, the 
context largely determines which behaviour 
is adaptive. Because, in contrast to an isolated 
facial expression, EBL provides the emotion 
as well as the associated action. EBL is a less 
ambiguous signal and a more direct call for 
attention and action in the observer.
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